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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
Appellant initiated this action by which it sought to judicially foreclose three separate 
mechanic's liens in accordance with Idaho Code § 45-501, et seq. After commencement, this 
action was consolidated with another mechanic's lien foreclosure action commenced by ACI 
Northwest, Inc. which involved the same real property located in Post Falls, Idaho. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On December 16, 2010, the Respondents, Dan S. Jacobson, Sage Holdings, LLC, Steven 
G. Lazar, The Mitchell A. Martin and Karen C. Martin Family Trust dated August 9,2005, and 
Devon Chapman (hereinafter collectively "Respondents"), filed Defendants' Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC. (Aug. R.). A hearing was held on 
Respondents' Motion on January 18,2011, at which time the trial court orally granted the 
Defendants' Motion. (Tr. p. 26, Is. 8-9). Following the hearing, the court issued an Order 
Granting Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC. 
(Aug. R.). That same day, the court issued a Partial Summary Judgment Against Kasco of 
Idaho, LLC, thereby establishing that each of Appellant's three claims of lien were lost and 
unenforceable against Respondents' interest in the real property encumbered thereby. (Aug. R.). 
On January 24,2011, Respondents submitted their Defendants' Third Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC. (Aug. R.). A hearing was held on 
Respondents' Motion on February 22,2011, at which time the trial court orally granted the 
Motion. (Tr. p. 47, Is. 15-25). Following the hearing, the court issued an Order Granting 
Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC and a Partial 
Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, both of which were entered on March 8, 2011. 
(Aug. R.). Pursuant to the Judgment, the trial court dismissed Appellant's third cause of action, 
identified as "Quantum Merit" [sic], against the Respondents, with prejudice. Id. 
On September 30,2011, Appellant filed an appeal in this action. (Supreme Court Docket 
No. 39244-2011). By order dated February 27,2012, this Court ultimately dismissed that appeal 
on the basis that it was untimely. 
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Following remittur, the trial court entered a Rule 54(b) Certificate as to Appellant's 
claims against the Respondents. (R. at 36-38). Afterwards, the Respondents' sought an award of 
their fees, costs and sanctions against Appellant. (Aug. R., Motionfor Costs, Attorney's Fees and 
Sanctions). A hearing on Respondents' Motion was held on November 19, 2012, at which time 
the trial court concluded Respondents were entitled to an award of their fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-123. (Aug. R., Order Approving Costs andAttorney's Fees). In 
addition, the trial court concluded that the Respondents were entitled to an award of their costs 
pursuant to Rule 54(d), LR.C.P. Id. On November 27,2012, a Judgment was entered against 
Appellant on behalf of the Respondents for the total amount of$33,914.25. (R. at 49-50). 
Appellant filed this appeal on October 30, 2012. (R. at 39-43). Thereafter, Appellant 
filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on December 7,2012. (R. at 51-56). 
C. Statement of Facts 
Respondents direct this Court to the following statement of facts to the extent those cited 
by Appellant are incomplete and/or fail to contain proper citations to the transcript and record of 
the proceedings below: 
1. On or about June 20, 2008, Monument Heights, LLC allegedly contracted Appellant 
to provide certain labor, materials and services in the improvement of three contiguous parcels of 
real property located in Post Falls, Idaho, each of which are approximately 20 acres in size. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 273, ~ 1.15). 
2. On June 20, 2008, Appellant allegedly commenced furnishing labor, materials and 
services in the improvement of real property owned by Monument Heights, LLC, located in Post 
Falls, Idaho. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 273, ~ 1.15). As of September 13, 2008, Appellant had 
ceased providing labor, materials and services.!d. 
3. On August 1,2008, Monument Heights, LLC executed and delivered to the 
Respondents a Deed of Trust conveying certain real property in Kootenai County, Idaho, to a 
trustee as security for payment of an indebtedness owed to the Respondents. (Aug. R., Affidavit 
of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. 1.); (39244-2011 R. at 275, ~ 2.7). The Deed of Trust was 
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subsequently recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 6, 2008 as Instrument 
2172582000.1d. 
4. On November 25, 2008, Appellant caused three mechanics liens to be recorded with 
the Kootenai County Recorder. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 274, ~ 2.2). The liens, each entitled 
"Claim of Lien", were recorded as Instrument Nos. 2187173000, 2187174000 and 2187175000. 
In confused and illogical fashion, the liens encumber four (4) parcels of real property, three of 
which are owned by Monument Heights, LLC and are identified in Respondents' Deed of Trust. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 285-294)1. 
5. On May 11, 2009, Appellant commenced this action to judicially foreclose its three 
mechanic's liens. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 1, p.148-72). In its initial pleading, Appellant simply 
named Monument Heights, LLC and John and Jane Doe 1-100, Owners, as the Defendants.ld. 
6. On December 18, 2009, the Appellant filed an amended pleading. (39244-2011 R., 
Vol. 1, p. 185-193). By its amended pleading, Appellant joined Respondents (Dan S. Jacobson, 
Sage Holdings, LLC, Steven G. Lazar, The Mitchell A. Martin and Karen C. Martin Family 
Trust Dated August 9, 2005, and Devon Chapman) as Defendants to this action.ld. 
7. Appellant's pleading recited three causes of action against the class of defendants 
generally: (1) foreclosure of materialman's lien; (2) breach of contract; and (3) quantum merit 
[sic].ld. 
8. With respect to the breach of contract claim, Appellant alleged 
3.1 A valid contract between the owners ... and all DEFENDANTS individually, as 
owners for KASCO to provide labor, materials, and services relating to the subject 
property. 
3.2 KASCO performed its obligations under the contract with DEFENDANTS 
individually and as owners, and/or agents for owners. 
I It is unknown why Appellant filed three separate claims oflien. For instance, Instrument No. 2187173000 
encumbers the three (3) parcels property owned by Monument Heights, LLC, in addition to a 20 acre parcel abutting 
the property to the north east which is owned by parties who have yet to be named or joined to this action by 
Appellant. Instrument No. 2187174000 on the other hand, encumbers the 20 acre parcel which lies due east of the 
other two parcels owned by Monument Heights. Finally, Instrument No. 2187175000 encumbers the two 20 acre 
parcels which are located due west of the parcel encumbered by Instrument 2187174000. Simply put, each ofthe 
parcels described in Instrument Nos. 2187174000 and 218717500 are described in Instrument 2187173000. 
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3.3 DEFENDANTS individually, as owners, and or as agents for owners breached 
the contract by failing to pay KASCO the amount for its labor, materials and 
or services in the sum of$140,378.00 plus interest at the highest lawful rate. 
3.4 This contract was a commercial transaction such that KASCO is entitled to 
attorney fees as previously alleged and pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-
120(3) and also under 12-120. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol. 1., p. 190",3.1-3.4). Appellant's Fifth Amended Verified Complaint filed 
on December 15, 2010, incorporated this same language. (39244-2011 R. Vol. 2, p. 276, W 3.1-
3.4) (emphasis added). 
9. With respect to Appellant's quantum merit [sic] claim, it alleged: 
4.1 DEFENDANTS individually, as owners, and/or as agents for owners accepted 
the labor, materials and services ofKASCO. 
4.2 The reasonable value of said labor, materials, and services is $140,378.00 
4.3 DEFENDANTS individual, as owners, and/or agents of owners have failed to 
pay for the reasonable value of the labor, materials, and services in said sum. 
4.4 That if DEFENDANTS individually, as owners, and/or agents of owners are 
not required to reimburse KASCO for said labor, materials, and or services, 
DEFENDANTS will be unjustly enriched by the value set forth above. 
4.5 KASCO does hereby request a trial by jury. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol. 1., p. 190-91, "4.1-4.5). Again, Appellant's Fifth Amended 
Verified Complaint filed on December 15,2010, incorporated this same language. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol 2, p. 276-277,,4.1-4.5). 
10. On October 15, 2010, Appellant filed its Fifth Amended Verified Complaint. (39244-
2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 270-297). 
11. On December 15,2010, Appellant agreed to dismiss its breach of contract claim 
against Respondents. 
12. On December 8, 2010, Respondents propounded a set of discovery requests upon 
Appellant. (Aug R., Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Third Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. A.). In response, Appellant averred under 
oath as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Please admit that you do not currently 
have a contractual relationship with Defendants Jacobson. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Plaintiff doesn't have 
enough information to either admit or deny and therefore Plaintiff denies the same 
on the basis that KASCO entered into a blasting contract but does not know the 
specific relationship between MONUMENT HEIGHTS and JACOBSON. The 
parties could have an agency relationship. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Please admit that you have never had a 
contractual relationship with Defendants Jacobson. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: KASCO cannot admit or 
deny and therefore denies the same pursuant to its answer to Request for 
Admission No.4. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Plaintiff does not have enough 
information to either admit or deny and therefore denies the same for the reason 
as stated in its answer to Request for Admission No.4. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: Please admit that you have never had any 
direct communication with Defendants Jacobson concerning the work that you 
performed on the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: If direct communication 
is defined as face-to-face colloquy with DAN S. JACOBSON, STEVEN G. 
LAZAR and DEVON CHAPMAN, then KASCO does not believe it has had 
conversations with said persons but cannot say that is employees have not had 
direct communications with said Defendants. With regard to SAGE HOLDINGS 
and THE MITCHELL A. MARTIN AND KARCEN [sic] C. MARTIN FAMILY 
TRUST, individuals have not been identified with regard to those individuals and 
therefore KASCO does not have enough information to either admit or deny and 
therefore denies the same. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Please admit that the Defendants Jacobson 
had no authority to control the scope of the work that you performed on the 
Subject Property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: KASCO does not have 
enough information to admit or deny and therefore denies the same base upon the 
foregoing answer to requests for admission. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Please admit that the Defendants Jacobson 
did not control, manage, or direct the work that you performed on the Subject 
Property. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 5 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: KASCO cannot admit or 
deny the Request for Admission and therefore denies the same based on the 
foregoing answers to Requests for Admission. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit that the Defendants 
Jacobson did not supervise the work that you performed on the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: KASCO cannot admit 
or deny this Request for Admission and therefore denies the same based upon the 
foregoing Answers to Requests for Admission. 
(Aug R., Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Third Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. B.). 
n. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of 
review used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 
P.3d 184, 190 (2013); citing Sec. Fin. Fund, LLC v. Thomason, 153 Idaho 343, 346 (2012). 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. LR.C.P. 56(c). When a summary 
judgment motion has been supported by depositions, affidavits, or other evidence, the adverse 
party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a 
slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; there must be 
sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the party opposing 
the motion. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85,87 (1986). 
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
McCorkle v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554 (Ct. App. 2005). "When the 
party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or proof at trial, the 
'genuine issue of material fact' burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an 
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element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial." Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 
308,311 (Ct. App. 1994). Once such an absence of evidence has been demonstrated, the burden 
shifts to the party opposing the motion to show through further depositions, discovery responses, 
or affidavits that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to show a valid justification for its 
failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f).Id. 
When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 
(1991). "However, where an action will be tried before the court without a jury 'the trial judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party, but rather the judge is free 
to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidentiary facts, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. ", Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 613 
(2012). 
"The decision to grant or deny a Rule 56(f) continuance is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd, 154 Idaho 99,294 P.3d 
1111, 1115 (2013); citing Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 572 (2011). In 
reviewing a discretionary decision, the proper inquiry is "(1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason:' Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991). 
"An award of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to review 
for an abuse of discretion.'" Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 
Idaho 688,694 (Ct. App. 2010); citing Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 712 (2009). Likewise, 
calculation of reasonable fees is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Partout v. 
Halper, 145 Idaho 683, 690 (2008). '''Whether the district court has correctly determined that a 
case is based on a 'commercial transaction' for the purpose of I.C. § 12-120(3) is a question of 
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law' over which this Court exercises free review." Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 
755 (2012). 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
E. Whether Respondents are Entitled to an Award of their Fees and Costs Incurred 
Defending this Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 11.2,40 and 41, and I.C. §§ 12-120(3) 
and 12-121. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Appellant has Failed to Demonstrate Why its Lien was not Rendered Lost and 
Unenforceable Due to its Failure to Timely Join the Respondents Within Six 
Months. 
In poor and disjointed fashion, Appellant challenges the district court's decision granting 
Respondents' second motion for summary judgment. Due to the incoherent manner in which 
Appellant presents this issue, it is hard to distil its arguments into a presentable format, much less 
respond in a logical manner. That being said, Appellant's argument appears to be dual-faceted. 
First, Appellant suggests its failure to timely comply with I.e. § 45-510 stems from the fact that 
it was without notice as to Respondents' interest in the subject property. Next, Respondent 
suggests, without much more, that LR.C.P. 17(d) somehow operated to toll operation ofI.C. § 
45-510. 
1. Idaho's Appellate Courts have Consistently Held that LC. § 45-510 
Renders a Lien Lost and Unenforceable Against those Subordinate 
Interests not Timely Joined. 
In Idaho, the right to file mechanic's liens exists solely as a result of statutory enactment. 
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 760 (1999). "The 
provisions of I.e. § 45-501 are to be liberally construed in the favor ofthe persons who perform 
labor upon or furnish materials to be used in the construction, alteration, or repair of a building 
or structure." L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 742-43 (2002); 
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citing Great Plains Equip., Inc., 132 Idaho at 760. "This rule, however, 'does not pennit the 
court to create a lien where none exists or was intended by the legislature.'" Id., at 743; citing 
Great Plains Equip., Inc., 132 Idaho at 761. "Therefore, while 'this section will be liberally 
construed,' 'the statutory requirements must be substantially complied with in order to perfect a 
valid mechanic's lien." Id.; citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 41 (1975). 
"Idaho Code § 45-510 provides a court with jurisdiction to enforce a lien when a lien is 
filed and an action commenced within six months." Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Branson, 154 Idaho 
678,302 P.3d 18,24 (2013). Specifically, that statute provides: 
No lien provided for in this chapter binds any building, mIlling claim, 
improvement or structure for a longer period than six (6) months after the claim 
has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court within that 
time to enforce such lien; or unless a payment on account is made, ... , and such 
payment or credit and expiration date, is indorsed on the record of the lien, then 
six (6) months after the date of such payment or expiration of extension. 
I.C. § 45-510. "The Idaho statute does not, in tenns, prescribe who shall be made parties to the 
action thereby required to be brought; but we agree with the learned judge of the court below that 
it necessarily means that it must be brought against all of those whose rights, estates, or interests 
are claimed to be adverse and subordinate; otherwise they could not be concluded." Cont'l & 
Commercial Trust & Sav. Bankv. Pac. Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915). 
"However, even if an action is brought to enforce a lien within a six month period, it is 
lost against the interests of persons not named." Parkwest Homes, LLC, 302 P.3d at 24; accord 
56 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 392 ("An action which does not include all necessary parties does 
not stop the running of the statute as to the omitted parties."); see also Western Loan & Bldg. Co. 
v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497, 185 P. 554, 555 (1919)("Of consequence, a mechanic's 
lien is lost and unenforceable against the interest of a junior lienholder not made a party to an 
action to foreclose the lien within the six month period."). "Thus, in a foreclosure action, the 
action (1) must be timely brought under statute; and (2) must timely name the proper interested 
parties." Id. 
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"This holding encourages judicial efficiency and finality of litigation by mandating the 
joinder of all interests and competing claims in a lien foreclosure action." Bonner Building 
Supply, Inc. v. Std. Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 686 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
"The limitation prescribed by statute of the time within which an action must be brought in a 
proper court for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien is not the ordinary statute of limitation, 
which is waived, ifnot pleaded." Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 
497, 185 P. 554,555 (1919). "The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a 
limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone." Id.; accord Terra- West, 
Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 403 (2010). "It is a condition attached to the right 
to sue at all." Id. 
2. There is no Dispute the Appellant Failed to Timely Join Respondents to 
the Underlying Lien Foreclosure Action. 
The pertinent facts supporting the trial court's entry of summary jUdgment on this front 
are simple and without dispute: 
• On November 25,2008, Appellant caused three (3) separate mechanic's liens to be 
recorded against the subject property owned by Monument Heights, LLC and which were 
encumbered by Respondents' deed of trust. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 274, , 2.2). 
• On May 11,2009, Appellant subsequently commenced this action by which it primarily 
sought to judicially foreclose each of its liens. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 1, p.l48-72). At that 
time, Appellant only named Monument Heights, LLC and John and Jane Doe 1-100, as 
defendants to the lien foreclosure action. Id. 
• On December 18, 2009, more than one year after Appellant recorded its mechanic's liens, 
it filed an amended pleading thereby joining the Respondents and asserting priority to 
their beneficial interest in the subject property; Amended Verified Complaint. (39244-
2011 R., Vol. 1, p. 185-193). By its amended pleading, Appellant has asserted that each 
of its liens are senior and takes priority to the Respondents' beneficial interest in the 
subject property. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 273-275). 
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There is no dispute that on August 6, 2008, a Deed of Trust was duly recorded with the 
Kootenai County Recorder granting the Respondents a beneficial interest in the subject property. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol. 1, p. 189, ~ 2.7; 39244-2011 R., Vol. 2, p. 275, ~ 2.7). The public 
document expressly names each of the beneficiaries, their respective interest in the security 
instrument, and unambiguously describes the property encumbered thereby. (Aug. R., Aff. of 
Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. 1). It is also equally clear that the instrument was a matter of public 
record for over three (3) months before Appellant initiated the underlying district court action. 
Thus, Appellant cannot escape the unavoidable fact that it failed to join the Respondents 
to the underlying lien foreclosure action within six (6) months after it recorded each of its 
mechanics liens. Consistent with the well established and recently affirmed appellate authority 
in Idaho, the trial court properly concluded that Appellant's mechanic's liens were rendered lost 
and unenforceable against Respondents' beneficial interest in the subject property due to its 
failure to timely join them. (Aug. R., Partial Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, 
issued January 18,2011). 
3. Appellant's Assertion that its Failure to Timely Join Respondents was 
Excused Due to a Want of Notice, is Without Any Basis in Law and 
Contrary to the Established Record. 
In an attempt to divert attention from its failure to comply with I.C. § 45-510, Appellant 
asserts in tenuous fashion "that there were genuine issues as to material facts as to the confusion 
of title with regard subject property." App. Brief, p. 14. For this reason, Therefore, it suggests 
this Court should grant it extraordinary equitable relief from the operation ofI.C. § 45-510. 
To begin, it is important to observe that Appellant has never suggested, much less 
demonstrated, that Respondents' deed of trust was not duly recorded or part of the chain of title 
for the subject property prior to filing suit. Rather, the record clearly demonstrates that, at a 
minimum, Appellant possessed constructive notice of Respondents' interest in the subject 
property well before filing suit. Idaho's recording act provides that properly recorded 
instruments have the effect of imparting constructive notice to all concerned parties. I.C. §§ 55-
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809 and 55-811; Adams v. Anderson, 142 Idaho 208,212 (2005). In the matter at hand, the 
record demonstrates: 
• On February 28,2007, Independent Mortgage Ltd., Co. ("Independent Mortgage") 
agreed to loan $1,240,000.00 ("first loan") to a group of borrowers which included 
Richard Abbey, Keri Abbey, Chad Ross, Brenny Ross, Chad Johnson and Roger 
Glessner. At that time, each of the borrowers were members of Monument Heights, 
LLC, the Defendant named in this action. (Aug. R., Supp. Aff. of Casey S. Krivor In 
Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, 
LLC, ~ 3). 
• In consideration ofthe first loan, the borrowers executed and delivered to Independent 
Mortgage Ltd., Co. a Mortgage of various parcels of real property in Kootenai County, 
Idaho, to secure performance and repayment ofthe loan. Id., at ~ 4. The Mortgage was 
recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on February 28,2007 as Instrument No. 
2085500000. (Aug R., Supp. Aff. of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. 2). 
• As further security for the first loan, the borrowers executed and delivered to Independent 
Mortgage Ltd., Co. a Timber Deed. (Aug. R., Supp. Aff. of Casey S. Krivor In Support of 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, ~ 5). The 
Timber Deed was recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on March 7, 2007 as 
Instrument No. 2086808000. (Aug R., Supp. Aff. of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of 
Defendants' Second Motionfor Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho , LLC, Ex. 3). 
• Subsequently, Independent Mortgage Ltd., Co. assigned its interest in the Promissory 
Note, Mortgage, and Timber Deed to two of the Respondents; Dan S. Jacobson and Sage 
Holdings, LLC. (Aug. R., Supp. Aff. of Casey S. Krivor In Support of Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, ~ 6). Mr. Jacobson and Sage 
Holdings, LLC each assumed a 50% interest in the note and related security instruments. 
Id. 
• On or about August 2008, the Promissory Note secured by the Mortgage was fully 
satisfied. Id., at ~ 8. Consistently, on August 10, 2007 a Partial Satisfaction was 
recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder as Instrument No. 2115763000. (Aug R., 
Supp. Aff. of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. 4). 
Prior to satisfaction of the first loan, Respondents, Dan S. Jacobson and Sage 
Holdings, LLC, executed a Quitclaim Deed releasing their interest in the 
harvestable timber located on the real property. (Aug. R., Supp. Aff. of Casey S. 
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Krivor In Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Kasco of Idaho, ~ 8). The instruments states "THE PURPOSE OF THIS 
QUITCLAIM DEED IS TO RELEASE ANY AND ALL INTEREST THE 
GRANTORS MAY HAVE TO ANY AND ALL MERCHANTABLE TIMBER 
LOCATED ON SAID DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY." Id. 
• Upon satisfaction of the Promissory Note, the escrow agent for the first loan was 
instructed to release and record the Quitclaim Deed. Id. As a result, the Quitclaim Deed 
was recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 19,2008 as Instrument No. 
2174357000. Id. 
• After the first loan was paid off, each of the Respondents collectively agreed to loan 
Monument Heights, LLC a sum of money ("second loan"). (Aug. R., Supp. Aff. of Casey 
S. Krivor In Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Kasco of Idaho, ~ 9). 
• In consideration, Monument Heights, LLC executed and delivered a Deed of Trust 
conveying the subject real property to a trustee as security for the second loan. (Aug. R., 
Supp. Aff. of Casey S. Krivor In Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, ~ 10; Aff. of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, Ex. 1). 
This instrument was duly recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 5, 
2008 as Instrument No. 2172582000. Id. 
• On November 25,2008, Appellant caused three (3) separate mechanic's liens to be 
recorded against the subject property owned by Monument Heights, LLC. (39244-2011 
R., Vol. 2, p. 274, ~ 2.2). 
• On May 11,2009, Appellant subsequently commenced this action by which it primarily 
sought to judicially foreclose each of its liens. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 1, p.148-72). At that 
time, Appellant only named Monument Heights, LLC and John and Jane Doe 1-100, as 
defendants to the lien foreclosure action. !d. 
Thus, it is beyond debate that Appellant had at least constructive notice of Respondents' interest 
both prior to recording its mechanic's liens and filing this subsequent action to foreclose those 
liens. 
In its Brief, Appellant frames the issues as such: 
the subsequent recording of the Quitclaim Deed on August 19, 2008, transferred 
the property from the Respondents to Monument Heights, LLC, and or the 
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subsequent recording by the Respondents caused confusion with the record of title 
and notice to the Appellant and therefore Appellant should be relieved from the 6-
month requirement as a result. 
App. Brief, p. 14. To provide some semblance of order to Appellant's argument, Respondents 
will address these arguments in the following fashion: (1) the legal significance of the quitclaim 
deed; and (2) the import of Appellant's subjective confusion as to the effect of the quitclaim 
deed. 
First, Appellant's argument misstates and embellishes the effect ofthe quitclaim deed. 
For starters, the instrument is only included in the chain oftitle between the parties to the "first 
loan"; ie: Richard Abbey, Keri Abbey, Chad Ross, Brenny Ross, Chad Johnson, Roger Glessner, 
and Dan S. Jacobson and Sage Holdings, LLC, as successors in interest to Independent 
Mortgage. After the first loan was paid off, the Respondents were granted a subsequent deed of 
trust encumbering the real property then owned by Monument Heights, LLC. Even if one were 
to disregard the separate chains of title at issue, the quitclaim deed was only executed by two of 
the five beneficiaries subsequently named in the Deed of Trust; Dan S. Jacobson and Sage 
Holdings, LLC. Put another way, Appellant has offered no suggestion or evidence that the other 
three Respondents, Steve Lazar, the Martin Family Trust, or Devon Chapman, ever released their 
interest in the subject property or that it was somehow mislead as to their claimed interests. 
More importantly, Appellant's argument also reflects a deep misunderstanding of the 
operation of a deed of trust. "Idaho is a title theory state, whereby a deed of trust is a title-
passing procedure." ParkWest Homes, LLCv. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 302 P.3d 18,24 (2013); 
see also LC. § 45-1513 ("A deed of trust ... shall be a conveyance of real property.") 
Consequently. "when a deed of trust is executed and delivered, the legal title of the property 
passes to the trustee", not the beneficiary. !d.; see also LC. § 45-1502(3) and (4). 
In its Brief, Appellant does not suggest how a beneficiary could unilaterally convey the 
legal title held by a trustee under a deed oftrust. Quite to the contrary, it is important to observe 
that it is the trustee, not the beneficiary, who reconveys the legal title following satisfaction of 
the obligation secured by the deed of trust. I.C. § 45-1514. With limited exceptions, a title 
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insurer or title agent may similarly release a deed oftrust upon satisfaction of the underlying 
obligation. I.C. § 45-1201, et seq. In sum, the quitclaim deed had no legal effect on the legal title 
of the estate of real property held by the trustee under the deed of trust. For this additional 
reason, Appellant's argument must fail. 
Second, Appellant maintains that the series of title documents executed and recorded 
between Monument Heights, LLC and Respondents caused it to become confused as to the status 
of title. (Aug. R., Briefin Support of Objection to Motionfor Summary Judgment, p. 3); see also 
App. Brief, p. 16. Appellant goes on to suggest that it was this same confusion that caused it to 
name "John and Jane Does 1-100" as defendants to its initial pleading. In support of its 
opposition to summary judgment, Appellant's manager averred: 
[Appellant's owner, manager and member] went to the records department at 
Kootenai County Idaho and researched the title of the property and located the 
Quitclaim Deed from [Respondents] Jacobson and Sage Holdings, attached 
hereon as Exhibit 3, based upon your affiant's prior contacts vvith ROGER 
GLESSNER, [Appellant] relied on said deed in believing that any deed of trust 
with regard said property was satisfied since said deed was the last to be recorded 
which purportedly transferred all interest in and to subject property to the 
members of MONUMENT HEIGHTS. 
[Appellant] relied on the record at Kootenai County when he relayed to counsel 
all parties your affiant believed had interest in and to subject property. 
(Aug. R., Supp. Aff. of Keith Sims in Support of Mot. for Reconsideration, ,-r,-r 2, 11 and 13). 
As the lien claimant, Appellant bore the burden to: (1) timely file suit to foreclose its 
mechanic's lien and (2) join each ofthe interested parties whose rights, estates, or interests are 
claimed to be adverse and subordinate. See Cont'/ & Commercia/ Trust & Sav. Bank, 222 F. 781 
at 788. It was not necessary that the Appellant subjectively understand the nature of the 
respective interests in the subject property prior to joining interested parties. Furthermore, it is 
not necessary that a lien claimant first subjectively determine which subordinate interests are 
valid and those which are not before filing suit. Along these same lines, there is no authority 
establishing that a lien claimant is excused from I.C. § 45-510 unless and until it possesses actual 
notice of each respective subordinate interest. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 15 
To placate its putative confusion regarding title, Appellant could have obtained a 
litigation guarantee from a licensed title insurer which would have disclosed each interested 
party. By not availing itself of this option, Appellant unilaterally assumed the risk ofloss due to 
its failure to adequately investigate the chain of title and timely join all interested parties. 
Next, Appellant ignores the clear and unambiguous language in the quitclaim deed which 
expressly provides that it only pertains to the merchantable timber located on the subject 
property. As noted supra, the deed provided in bold typeface: 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS QUITCLAIM DEED IS TO RELEASE ANY AND 
ALL INTEREST THE GRANTORS MAY HA VE TO ANY AND ALL 
MERCHANTABLE TIMBER LOCATED ON SAID DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY. 
(Aug. R., Supp. Ajf. of Casey S. Krivor In Support of Defendants' Second Motionfor Summary 
Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, ~ 8). Had Appellant reviewed the Quitclaim Deed as he 
averred, this express and conspicuous reservation should have quickly dispelled any confusion in 
Appellant. 
Next, Appellant's reliance on Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Std. Forest Prod., Inc. is 
misplaced. 106 Idaho 682 (Ct. App. 1984). From a procedural standpoint, Bonner is a unique 
case. That appeal started as an action to quiet title between a lien claimant and judgment lienor, 
both of which claimed to hold competing legal titles to the subject property.ld. 
In that case, the judgment lienor obtained a foreign judgment against a "Chuck Britton," 
which was an alias used by Paul Cims. Id. at 683-84. Afterwards, it domesticated the judgment 
in Idaho against "Chuck Britton" and subsequently executed against real property owned by 
judgment debtor. Id. At the sale, the judgment lienor purchased the 10t.Id. Following the sale 
and expiration ofthe redemption period, the judgment lienor was granted a sheriffs deed.Id. 
Prior to when the judgment lienor domesticated its foreign judgment, the lien claimant 
furnished building materials to Mr. Cims.Id. After Mr. Cims failed to pay for the materials, the 
lien claimant filed a mechanic's lien which was recorded after the sheriffs sale.Id. Then the 
lien claimant timely filed suit to foreclose its mechanic's lien but did not name the judgment 
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lienor. Id. The lien claimant was ultimately granted a default judgment and purchased the 
property at a subsequent sheriff's sale. Id. Following expiration of the redemption period, the 
lien claimant was similarly granted a sheriff's deed to the same parcel of real property. Id. Upon 
discovering that the judgment lienor also possessed a sheriff s deed for the property, the lien 
claimant filed a subsequent action to quiet title to the real property. 
Much like the case at bar, the Court of Appeals held that due to the lien claimant's failure 
to "foreclose against [the judgment lienholder] within six months ofthe filing of its claim of lien, 
it lost its lien against the property in regard to the [judgment lienor]." Id., at 686. It is important 
to note that the Court of Appeals reached this conclusion despite its concern that a material issue 
of fact existed as to whether judgment lien properly appeared in the chain of title due use of an 
alias. Id., at 686. As such, it remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the lien 
claimant was entitled to equitable relief from the quieting title. Id. More importantly, the Court 
of Appeals did not excuse the lien claimant's failure to timely join the judgment lienor to the 
foreclosure action despite its stated concern as to whether the lien claimant had constructive 
notice of the judgment lien. 
Unlike that in Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., the record demonstrates that Appellant had 
constructive notice of Respondents' deed of trust prior to recording its liens and filing this action. 
Appellant's confusion stems from a lack of understanding and failure to properly investigate the 
chain of title as opposed to any errors or omissions in the instruments of record. For these 
important distinguishing factors, Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. lends no support to Appellant's 
suggestion that it is entitled to extraordinary equitable relief from the operation of Idaho Code § 
45-510. 
4. Appellant has Failed to Demonstrate Error by way of Specific References 
to the Transcripts and Record. 
As the Appellant, it bore the burden of demonstrating the complained of error in the 
record. Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 300 P .3d 43, 
52 (2013). "Unless the appellant affirmatively demonstrates error from the record, this Court 
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presumes that the trial court's decision was proper." Id. Along these lines, Idaho Appellate 
Rules remind Appellants as follows: 
Appellant's Brief. The brief of the appellant shall contain the following 
divisions under appropriate headings: 
Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. 
LA.R. 35(a)(6). Further, this Court has held on numerous occasions '''if issues on appeal 
are not supported by propositions oflaw, authority or argument, they will not be 
considered ... A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is 
lacking, not just if both are lacking.'" Hurtado v. Land o 'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18 
(2012). 
In support of its first issue, Appellant devotes a considerable amount of effort at 
citing this Court to what it feels is controlling authority. Despite this, much of the 
putative facts recited throughout Appellant's analysis are not supported by any references 
to the transcript or record. In the few instances where Appellant does cite to the record, it 
merely provides generalized cites without any pinpoint references. Due to the deficient 
manner in which Appellant presents this issue, it should be deemed to have waived it 
upon appeal. Alternatively, Respondents submit that this Court must presume the trial 
court's award of summary judgment was proper and therefore affirm the same. 
5. Appellant's Colorful Argument that I.R.C.P. 17(d) Tolls the Requirements 
ofLe. § 45-510 is Amusing, at Best. 
In its Brief, Appellant suggests without much by way of reasoned analysis, that LR.C.P. 
17( d) somehow excused it from the more specific and controlling six months period of 
limitations as defined by I.C. § 45-510. To begin, it must be noted that LR.C.P. 17(d) is merely a 
court rule of procedure. That Rule simply provides: 
(d) Unknown Owners or Heirs as Parties. In all actions or proceedings to obtain 
title or possession, or to remove adverse claim of title, or to quiet title, or for 
partition, or for sale, or for foreclosure of any incumbrance, or enforcement of any 
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trust, or specific performance of any contract, or for any other disposition of any 
property, real, personal, or mixed, situated within the state of Idaho including 
choses in action either situated within or due or claimed to be due from persons, 
firms or corporations resident within the state of Idaho, persons may be made 
parties defendant either on the filing of the complaint, counterclaim or cross-
claim, as the case may be, or at any time thereafter by amendment thereof, by the 
name and description of unknown owners, or unknown heirs or unknown devisees 
of any deceased person, or by any of such designations. 
I.R.C.P. 17( d). Appellants' contention that the requirements of I.C. § 45-510 must yield to 
LR.C.P. 17(d) confuses the hierarchy oflaws. It would be an odd inversion of this hierarchy if 
Rule 17(d) somehow relaxed the heightened six-month period oflimitations as mandated by I.C. 
§ 45-510. u.s. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,312 (1998). 
More alarming, Appellant seemingly suggests that l.R.C.P. 17( d) should be liberally 
applied to further the underlying purposes ofIdaho's mechanic's lien act; LC. § 45-501. 
Respondents' acknowledge the longstanding body oflaw seemingly cited by all lien claimants 
which states that "the provisions ofLC. § 45-501 are to be liberally construed in the favor ofthe 
persons who perform labor upon or furnish materials to be used in the construction, alteration, or 
repair of a building or structure." L & W Supply Corp., 136 Idaho at 742-43; citing Great Plains 
Equip., Inc., 132 Idaho at 760. Appellant, however, fails to recognize the more pertinent line of 
authority which holds "th[at] rule, however, 'does not permit the court to create a lien where 
none exists or was intended by the legislature.'" !d., at 743. 
Once again, it must be noted for the Appellant that "the time within which the suit must 
be broUght operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone." 
Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 185 P. at 555. Thus, its request that the time limitations imposed by 
I.C. § 45-510 be softened by I.R.C.P. 17(d) would have the effect of "creating a lien [ie. liability] 
where none exists." For these fundamental reasons, Appellant's argument fails. 
B. The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Appellant's 
Continuance Motion. 
Appellant claims in perfunctory manner that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to grant its requested continuance to the hearing on Respondents' third motion for 
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summary judgment. First, Appellant has failed to adequately preserve the record on this front. 
Second, Appellant should be deemed to have waived this issue due to the deficient manner in 
which it is presented on appeal. Third, without challenging the underlying grant of summary 
judgment, Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the denial amounts to anything but harmless 
error. Finally, the Supreme Court has previously held in situations akin to the matter at hand, 
that the failure to diligently prosecute an action is grounds for denial of a motion to continue. 
To begin, the Appellant has merely provided this Court with a transcript from the hearing 
on Respondents' third motion for summary judgment. (Tr. p. 27-61). Appellant, however, has 
failed to include a copy of its motion to continue in the Clerk's Record. This oversight, however, 
is perhaps overshadowed by the fact that Appellant failed to serve the trial court with a copy of 
the putative motion prior to the scheduled summary judgment hearing. (Tr. p. 37, L. to). 
Further, the Appellant has failed to include a copy of Respondents' objection which was 
considered by the trial court in arriving at its reasoned decision. (Tr. p. 39, Is. 13-16). 
As the Appellant, it bore the affirmative duty to demonstrate error. Student Loan Fund of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 54 (1997). "When the record on appeal does not contain 
the evidence taken into account by the district court, 'we must necessarily presume that the 
evidence justifies the decision and that the findings are supported by substantial evidence. ", Id.; 
accord Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 174 (2007) ("In the absence of a 
proper record on appeal, we must assume there is substantial competent evidence to support the 
trial court's decision."). Due to Appellant's failure to adequately preserve the record on appeal, 
there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the trial court's denial of its motion to continue 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Most recently, this Court held "'if issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of 
law, authority or argument, they will not be considered ... A party waives an issue on appeal if 
either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. '" Hurtado, 153 Idaho at 18; 
citing Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 16 (2007); accord Us. v. Zannino, 895 
F.2d 1, 17 (1 st Cir. 1990) (Holding it is a well "settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a 
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed 
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waived."). In an oft-quoted phrase, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remarked that appellate 
judges "are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." us. v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,956 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
In its Brief, Appellant merely relies upon one appellate decision, which it suggests stands 
for the proposition "if the District Court's denial of a motion for continuance deprives the 
applicant of a fundamentally fair trial, the appellate courts can overturn the ruling." See Lambert 
v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 780 (Ct. App. 1989). Appellant's sole reliance upon the 
Lambert decision is misplaced as the Lambert decision was focused on whether the trial court 
erred in granting the defendant's motion to continue a trial to secure an expert witness' 
attendance. Lambert, 115 Idaho at 782. Beyond the fact that continuances are committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, the Lambert decision has no import to the situation at hand; 
that being, whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Appellant's motion 
to continue a summary judgment hearing. 
Moreover, Appellant's Brief fails to direct this Court to specific instances in the record 
and transcripts which demonstrate the trial court abused its decision. This oversight is further 
compounded by a complete lack of analysis. Due to a lack of controlling authority, reasoned 
analysis, and pertinent cites to the record and transcript, Appellant should be deemed to have 
waived this issue on appeal. 
Thirdly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a substantial right has been affected, 
which again, is a fatal flaw. Rule 61, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for 
vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
On appeal, Appellant only challenges the trial court's denial of its motion to continue. 
Surprisingly, it does not take issue with the trial court's decision granting Respondent's third 
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motion for summary judgment. This oversight is amplified by the fact that the Appellant has yet 
to make a proffer of the nature of the deposition testimony that it was unable to provide to the 
trial court prior to the summary judgment hearing. 
Without a proffer, there was no basis for the trial court of this Court to assess the 
admissibility or relevance of the evidence. Further, Appellant has made no demonstration that 
the testimony could have the possibly created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to 
survive summary judgment. Thus, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude the requested 
continuance was warranted and outweighed the inherent inconvenience, delay, and further 
expense to the parties. For this reason, Respondents submit the record can only yield one 
conclusion; the complained of error was anything but harmless. 
Finally, the situation at bar is on par with that recently dispatched in Boise Mode, LLC, 
294 P.3d at 1] 16. In that case, the Court began by noting the moving party seeking a Rule 56(f) 
continuance "must do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why [they] cannot respond 
to a movant's affidavits and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by 
discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of 
fact." Id. Furthermore, "the movant has the burden of setting out what further discovery would 
reveal that is essential to justify their opposition, making clear what information is sought and 
how it would preclude summary judgment." Id. Recognizing the policies exposed by art. I, § 18 
ofthe Idaho Constitution and I.R.C.P. 1, the Court went on to hold "the legal standard governing 
the district court's exercise of discretion when deciding a Rule 56(f) motion permits 
consideration of the moving party's previous lack of diligence in pursuing discovery." Id., at 
1117 
In Boise Mode, the defendant noticed its summary judgment motion for hearing 63 days 
before the scheduled trial. In response, the plaintiff moved for a 56(f) continuance on the basis 
the defendant's discovery responses, which it had received over six months earlier, were 
insufficient. Id. Further, the motion to continue was filed 17 days prior to the discovery cut-off 
and 212 months prior to trial. Id. With these facts in mind, the district court denied the plaintiffs 
motion noting it "did not provide sufficient reasoning as to why six months intervened between 
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the receipt of initial discovery answers, which they allege were unsatisfactory, and any attempt to 
discover additional relevant information." 
Turning the matter at hand, Appellant commenced this action on May 11, 2009. (39244-
2011 R., Vol. 1, p.148-72). On December 18, 2009, Appellant filed an amended pleading by 
which the Respondents were joined to this action and asserted a cause of action for "Quantum 
Merit" [sic]. On January 24,2011, over one full year after the amended pleading was filed, 
Respondents timely filed and served their third motion for summary judgment challenging 
Appellant's cause of action for "Quantum Merit." (Aug. R., Defendants' Third Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC). 
Although it still remains unclear, Appellant purports to have filed a motion to continue 
and motion to shorten time either the day of, or the business day prior to, the scheduled hearing? 
On February 22,2011 at 8:21 a.m., Appellant filed its opposition to Respondents' motion for 
summary judgment. (Aug R. at Brief in Support of Objection to Jacobson's [sic J Third Motion 
for Summary Judgment). A hearing on the Motion was subsequently conducted that same day at 
3:00 p.m. (Tr. p. 27-47). 
At the time Respondents filed their third motion for summary judgment, this matter had 
been pending for over 1 Yz years. Moreover, Appellant's "Quantum Merit" claim had been 
pending against Respondents for over 13 months before they moved for summary judgment. 
More importantly perhaps, a trial was scheduled to commence a little more than two months after 
the hearing date. 
Much like the moving party in Boise Mode, Appellant had ample time and opportunity to 
conduct discovery before Respondents filed their third motion for summary judgment. Despite 
this obvious fact, Appellant offered no explanation why it was not able to conduct or obtain the 
deposition testimony any earlier. Further, it cannot go without noting that both Appellant's 
2 The hearing took place on Tuesday, February 22,20 II. President's Day Holiday was observed on Monday, 
February 21,2011. A copy of Appellant's motion to continue is not included in either the original Clerk's Record or 
Augmented Record. Further, there is no indication in the transcript as to exactly when the motion was filed with the 
trial court. (Tr. p. 37, L. 10 - p. 39, L. 4). Despite counsel's representation, there is nothing in the transcripts or 
record indicating the fax confirmations were presented to the trial court. (Tr. p. 39, Is. 3-4). 
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opposition and motion to continue were submitted extremely late. Despite the lack of proper 
notice, Appellant has not offered any explanation as to why it failed to timely seek a continuance 
in accordance with the time parameters ofI.R.C.P. 7(b)(e). 
Akin to that in Boise Mode, Appellant has further failed to explain why it was still 
actively developing the facts supporting the prima facie case for each of its causes of action 
approximately two months before the trial was to commence. Disregarding any possible 
violations ofI.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) that may have occurred when the amended pleading was filed, it is 
disheartening to think that the party bearing the burden of proof is without any evidence which to 
support its causes of action sufficient to defeat summary judgment two months before triaL 
To force Respondents to sit idle while Appellants fumble their way through this action in 
attempt to cobble together a prima facie case is contrary to policies exposed by both art. I, § 18 
of the Idaho Constitution and I.R. c.P. 1. Disregarding the deficient manner in which this issue is 
presented on appeal, Respondents submit that Appellant's claim similarly fails substantively. 
C. Appellant has Failed to Demonstrate how the Trial Court Erred in Awarding Fees 
and Costs to Respondents. 
In an attempt to challenge the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs, Appellant 
advances a confused, multi-front attack. Appellant begins by casually attacking the trial court's 
analysis ofthe requested fees under the factors set forth by I.R.C.P. 54(e). Next, Appellant 
contends there was no requisite "commercial transaction" to support the trial court's award under 
I.c. § 12-120(3). Then, Appellant maintains its arguments regarding priority were not frivolous 
or unreasonable. Afterwards, it goes on to argue the trial court's award of fees under I.e. § 12-
121 was in error as the case was not brought frivolously. Finally, Appellant finishes out by 
arguing that the fees should not have been awarded as they did not relate to the priority ofliens. 
To provide some order to this confusing challenge, Respondent will address each argument in 
the manner in which they are raised. 
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1. Appellant has Failed to Demonstrate that the Trial Court Abused its 
Discretion in Calculating Reasonable Attorney's Fees. 
In rather casual fashion, Appellant maintains that trial court erred in employing the 
factors set forth under LR.C.P. 54(e)(e) when assessing the reasonableness of Respondents' 
claimed fees. While Appellant does cite the Court to limited controlling authority interpreting 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3), it fails to demonstrate by way of developed argument and references to the 
transcript and record, how the trial court abused its broad discretion. 
"When awarding attorney's fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set 
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate." 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750-51 (2008). "Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the 
district court to make specific findings in the record, only to consider the stated factors in 
determining the amount of the fees. When considering the factors, the courts need not 
demonstrate how they employed those factors in reaching an award amount." Id. "The bottom 
line in an award of attorney fees is reasonableness." BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. JUB Engineers, 
Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 297 (2010). In reaching that determination, the Supreme Court has 
remarked: 
What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for the determination of the court, 
taking into consideration the nature of the litigation, the amount involved in the 
controversy, the length of time utilized in preparation for and the trial of the case 
and other related factors viewed in the light of the knowledge and experience of 
the court as a lawyer and judge; it is not necessary in this connection that he hear 
any evidence on the matter although it is proper that the court may have before it 
the opinion of experts. 
BECO Const. Co., Inc., 149 Idaho at 297; citing Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 
281 (1977). 
In its Brief, Appellant makes quite a few broad assertions regarding the nature of the 
attorney's fees awarded to the Respondents. It fails, however, to cite this Court to any instances 
in the transcript or record which demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Moreover, 
there is absolutely no analysis of how the trial court abused its discretion. As such, all this Court 
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is left with is generalized authority and conjecture from the Appellant. Once again, due to the 
undeveloped manner in which Appellant has presented this issue, it should be deemed to have 
waived it on appeal. Hurtado, 153 Idaho at 18. 
2. Appellant's Numerous Allegations of a "Commercial Transaction" Were 
Sufficient to Trigger an Award of Fees Under LC. § 12-120(3). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that I.C. § 12-120(3) is not available where the action 
solely seeks judicial foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. L&W Supply Corp., 136 Idaho at 742. 
Contemplating situations like the matter at hand, it has further noted: 
. . . if more than one claim is pled, there can be more than one 'gravamen,' and 
attorney fees can still be awarded for a specific claim, if a claim is of the type 
covered by I.C. § 12-120(3) 'even though a claim is covered by other theories that 
would not have triggered application of the statute.' 
Great Plains Equip., Inc., 136 Idaho at 472. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) broadly provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party 
where the underlying claim involved a "commercial transaction." "An award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is proper if 'the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, 
and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.'" Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728 (2007). 
A contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to an award of fees under 12-120(3). 
"Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 
12-120(3), that claim triggers the application ofLC. § 12-120(3) and a prevailing party may 
recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established." Property Mgmt. West, 
Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897,900 (1995). Thus, "allegations in the complaint that the parties 
entered into a commercial transaction and that the complaining party is entitled to recover based 
upon that transaction, are sufficient to trigger the application of I.e. § 12-120(3)." Garner v. 
Pavey, 151 Idaho 462, 470 (2011). 
Since Respondents were joined to this action, they have been forced to defend two 
alternative causes of action against; breach of contract; and quantum meruit. In each ofthe 
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numerous amended pleadings Appellant has filed in this action, it has consistently alleged the 
existence of a contract between itself and all of defendants: 
3.1 A valid contract between the owners ... and all DEFENDANTS individually, as 
owners for KASCO to provide labor, materials, and services relating to the subject 
property. 
3.2 KASCO performed its obligations under the contract with DEFENDANTS 
individually and as owners, and/or agents for owners. 
3.3 DEFENDANTS individually, as owners, and or as agents for owners breached 
the contract by failing to pay KASCO the amount for its labor, materials and 
or services in the sum of $140,378.00 plus interest at the highest lawful rate. 
3.4 This contract was a commercial transaction such that KASCO is entitled to 
attorney fees as previously alleged and pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-
120(3) and also under 12-120. 
(39244-2011 R., Vol. 1., p. 190, W 3.1-3.4; 39244-2011 R. Vol. 2, p. 276, W 3.1-3.4) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, Appellant has consistently maintained throughout these proceedings that it is 
entitled to an award ofattorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on the basis that a "commercial 
transaction" was involved. Ultimately, these suggestions failed for a want of legal and factual 
support. 
Based upon the record and files presented at the trial court level, Respondents submit that 
Appellant should be estopped, judicially or equitably, from asserting there was no requisite 
"transaction" between itself and the Respondents. Accord Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 437 
(2003) ("In these circumstances, we conclude that it would defeat the legislative purpose of § 12-
120(3)-to allow the prevailing party to recover attorney fees expended in litigating a commercial 
transaction claim-if [the defendant] were not allowed to recoup his attorney fees for defense of 
the quasi-contract claims in this case."). Had Appellant prevailed on these causes of action, it is 
likely that it would have recovered its fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). Following this line of 
reasoning, there is no basis to treat the Respondents differently, but for Appellant's failure to 
demonstrate a requisite "transaction" between the parties. 
Due to Appellant's decision to generally assert a breach of contract and quantum merit 
[sic] claim against the class of "Defendants," Respondents were forced to incur fees and costs in 
defense thereof. Appellant put Idaho Code § 12-120(3) into play when it made a calculated 
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decision to assert a breach of contract claim against "DEFENDANTS." Further, it also triggered 
operation of the statute when it claimed entitlement to an award of fees this statute. Appellant 
should not be allowed to play fast and loose with the judiciary through the constant shift in 
positions and theory of its case. Therefore, Respondents submit that the trial court properly 
concluded that they were entitled to an award offees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
3. Appellant's Contention Regarding the Reasonableness of its Argument for 
Seeking A Reversal of Existing Law Are Misplaced. 
The third-prong of Appellant's challenge to the award of attorney's fees is a confusing 
mix of block citations and undeveloped argument. First, Appellant begins by citing the standards 
for an award of sanctions under Rule 11(a)(l)3 and I.e. § 12-123. The relevance of Appellant's 
reliance on this authority is yet to be seen as neither were invoked by the trial court in making its 
award of attorney's fees and costs to the Respondents. (Aug. R. Order Approving Attorney's 
Fees and Costs). 
Next, Appellant claims that it did not bring this action frivolously as its "arguments 
centered around a good faith attempt to show the need for a reversal" of existing law, to wit, I.e. 
§ 45-510. App. Brief, p. 28. Lest Appellant has forgotten, Respondents' motion for fees and the 
trial court's subsequent award, were strictly limited to those fees incurred defending the "breach 
of contract and equitable claims filed by Plaintiff, Kasco of Idaho, LLC." (Aug. R.,Memo. of 
Costs and Attorney's Fees, p. 3, '9). Once again, it has yet to be demonstrated how Appellant's 
subjective intention to seek a reversal ofLC. § 45-510 is relevant to the trial court's award of 
fees incurred by Respondents successfully defending against the alternative causes of action. 
3 Appellant's Brief fails to clarifY what set of Rules it refers to. Presumably, it is a reference to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). 
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4. The Trial Court's Award of Attorney's Fees Was Proper Under I.C. § 12-
121. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Of further assistance, Rule 54(e)(1), I.R.c.P., defines those instances where an award under I.C. 
§ 12-121 is warranted: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or de{ended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation . .. 
If an award under that section is made, the trial court is to "make a written finding, either in the 
award or in a separate document, as to the basis and reasons for awarding such attorney fees." 
I.R.C.P.54(e)(2). 
Attorneys fees per Idaho Code § 12-121 are appropriate "when the court, in its discretion, 
is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation." McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562 (2003). "When 
deciding whether the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account." Id. "Even 
though an action might be proper at its commencement, facts might thereafter develop which 
indicate that the case was then pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Win of 
Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754 (2002). 
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At the hearing conducted on November 19,2012, the trial court awarded attorney's fees 
to the Respondents pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.C. § 12-121. (Tr. p. 91, L. 26 -po 92, L. 
14). Consistent with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2), the trial court subsequently issued written findings as to 
the basis for its award of fees under I.C. § 12-121. Specifically, the trial court found: 
In accordance with Rule 54(e)(2), I.R.C.P., this Court concludes that this action 
was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation for the 
following reasons: 
a. Plaintiff broadly asserted alternative causes of action for breach of 
contract and quantum meruit against the Defendants; 
b. Plaintiff lacked a sufficient basis in fact or law to support asserting these 
alternative causes of action against the Defendants; 
c. Plaintiffhas never agreed to voluntarily dismiss these claims; 
d. Defendants could not ignore these claims. As result, Defendants incurred 
the claimed reasonable attorney's fees in obtaining dismissal and a final 
judgment as to each of these alternative claims; and 
e. Under the circumstances, the Court finds and concludes that an award of 
the Defendants' reasonable attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
appropriate. 
(Aug. R., Order Approving Costs and Attorney's Fees, p. 2); see also (Tr. p. 91, L. 23 - 92, L. 
12). 
Noticeably absent in its Brief is any discussion by the Appellant of how the trial court's 
findings under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) were erroneous. Rather, Appellants' argument is devoted to 
legitimizing its decision to join Respondents to this action. Again, the trial court's award of fees 
was limited to those fees incurred by Respondents defending the alternative causes of action 
asserted by Appellant. While Appellant may have been justified in joining Respondents to this 
action, it has yet to establish that it had any basis in fact or law for asserting either of the 
alternative causes of action against Respondents. Again, it must be emphasized that it was the 
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Appellant's burden to demonstrate error on appeal. Having failed to do so, Respondents' submit 
this Court should affirm the trial court's award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-12l. 
5. The Awarded Fees Were Reasonably Incurred by Respondents 
Successfully Defending the Alternative Causes of Action Asserted by 
Appellant During the Course of the Protracted Litigation. 
In closing, Appellant argues the "fees were and are excessive and did not relate to the 
priority ofliens which is the reason they were brought into this litigation." App. Brief, p. 31. 
Once again, it is important to remind Appellant that it originally asserted two alternative causes 
of action against the Respondents which they were forced to defend. As outlined above, the trial 
court's award was strictly limited to those fees Respondents calculated were incurred defending 
those causes of action. Appellant contention that the fees do not relate to the priority ofliens 
further demonstrates the confused nature of its appeal. 
Next, Appellant asserts in conclusory fashion that Respondents' award of fees should 
have been limited to the sum of$6,027.00. Unsurprisingly, Appellant fails to demonstrate how 
this amount was calculated, nor does it include any references to the transcripts or record to 
substantiate this bold argument. Conversely, Appellant fails to articulate and demonstrate why 
the balance of the fees awarded to Respondents were not reasonably incurred. Once again, it was 
the Appellant's burden to demonstrate that the trial court abused its broad discretion in 
calculating the amount of fees. Due to its failure to articulate through cogent analysis, sound 
legal argument, along with specific references to the transcripts and record, Appellant has failed 
to properly meet its burden. 
D. Appellant has Failed to Demonstrate that it is Entitled to Fees on Appeal. 
In confusing fashion, Appellant asserts that it is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. First, Appellant frames the issue on appeal as "Should the 
Appellants be awarded their costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) and Idaho Code 
§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 on appeaL" In its argument, however, Appellant makes no further 
reference to either I.C. § 12-120(3) or I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). 
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As outlined below, the undeveloped nature of Appellant's claim to fees and costs is fatal 
to this issue on appeal. Disregarding the deficient manner in which Appellant's claim is 
presented, it should be noted that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "apply uniformly in the 
district courts and the magistrate's divisions ofthe district courts in the state ofIdaho. I.R.C.P. 
l(a). Compare Rule 2(a), LA.R. ("These rules shall govern all appeals ... in the Supreme 
Court."). Lest Appellant has forgotten, this Appeal is pending before the Idaho Supreme Court. 
As such, it is the Idaho Appellate Rules, not the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern 
the procedures of this Appeal. Thus, it is I.A.R. 41 which provides the procedural mechanism 
for requesting an award of attorney fees on appeal. Without more, however, this Court has 
previously held that LA.R. 41 does not provide it with authority for awarding attorney's fees. 
Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599, 602-3 (2003). 
Next, Appellant cannot recover an award of its attorney's fees incurred on appeal which 
are related to its foreclosure claim under either I.C. § 12-120(3) or 12-121. To begin, 
Appellant's lien foreclosure cause of action is governed by I.C. § 45-501, et seq. Idaho's 
appellate courts have consistently held that the attorney's fee provision contained in that Act 
does not permit an award of fees on appeal. See First Federal Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. 
Riedesel Engineering, Inc., 154 Idaho 626, 638 (2012). 
Further, Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held "where two statutes appear to 
apply to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control over the more general 
statute." Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419 (2008). For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
held "because section 45-513 is a specific statute providing for an award of attorney fees in 
proceedings to foreclose a mechanic's lien, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and 12-121, which are 
general statutes, do not apply." Parhvest Homes, LLC, 302 P.3d at 26; accord First Federal Sav. 
Bank of Twin Falls, 154 Idaho at 638. For these reasons, it is clear that neither I.C. § 12-120(3) 
or 12-121 provides an avenue of relief as to those fees Appellant incurred on its lien foreclosure 
cause of action. 
In its Brief, Appellant devotes two woefully, undeveloped paragraphs of argument. 
I.A.R. 35(a)(6) provides: 
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Appellant's Brief. The brief of the appellant shall contain the following 
divisions under appropriate headings: 
Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. 
As this Court has held on numerous occasions, the mere citation to a statute or rule, "without 
providing any argument, is insufficient for an award of attorney fees on appeal." Sims v. Daker, 
154 Idaho 975,303 P.3d 1231, 1236 (2013); accord Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318,325 
(2012); see also Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805 (2010). 
In support of its claim to fees under I.C. § 12-121, Appellant alleges that "Respondent 
[sic] consistently misrepresented the record throughout the summary judgment and motions for 
reconsideration hearings." Unfortunately, Appellant fails to develop this assertion with reference 
to the transcripts or record. Without more, there is nothing by which the veracity ofthis bold 
statement can be assessed. 
Moreover, Appellant's argument includes one general citation to putative controlling 
authority. The citation, however, does not direct this Court to any specific quote or language 
from the case which it claims has bearing on this issue on appeal. 
Due to the woefully deficient manner in which Appellant has presented this issue on 
appeal, its claim to attorney's fees and costs must fail. 
E. Respondents are Entitled to an Award of their Costs and Reasonable Attorney's 
Fees Incurred Defending this Appeal. 
Respondents should be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
defending this Appeal pursuant to Rules 11.2, 40 and 41, I.A.R., and Idaho Code § 12-121. 
For the same reasons outlined in opposition to Appellant's claimed fees, Respondent 
concede that I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 cannot provide an avenue of relief as to those fees 
incurred on appeal directly related to Appellant's lien foreclosure claim. With the exception of 
the first issue, the balance of the issues raised by Appellant on appeal were unrelated to 
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Appellant's lien foreclosure. Thus, Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 are available as to 
issues. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) broadly provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party 
where the underlying claim involved a "commercial transaction." "An award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is proper if 'the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, 
and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.'" Blimka 143 Idaho at 
728. As previously noted, "where a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a 
type embraced by section 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application ofLC. § 12-120(3) and a 
prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established." 
Property Mgmt. West, Inc., 126 Idaho at 900. Finally, "Idaho Code §12-120(3) generally 
mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Bott v. 
Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 481 (1992). 
As discussed above, the trial court previously concluded that the Appellant sufficiently 
alleged the existence of a commercial transaction with the Respondents sufficient to trigger 
application ofLC. § 12-120(3). Consistent with this finding, Respondents should be further 
awarded their fees and costs incurred defending against the three issues raised on appeal by the 
Appellant which are unrelated to its lien foreclosure claim. 
Next, LC. § 12-121 provides in part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees ... 
"This code section allows the Court the discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party." 
Belstler v. Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 827 (2011). 
"Normally, this Court will award attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121 if the appeal 
merely invites the Court to reweigh the evidence or second guess the lower court, of if the appeal 
was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id.; citing Crowley 
v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514 (2007). This Court has "repeatedly stated that 'where issues 
of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the appellant fails to make a 
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cogent challenge the judge's exercise of discretion.'" JUB Eng'r, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of 
Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 318 (2008). "Finally, an award of attorney fees is appropriate if the 
law is well settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the trial court 
misapplied the law." 
Similarly, Rule 11.2, Idaho Appellate Rules, provides: 
(a) ... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the 
attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other 
document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If the notice 
of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the notice of appeal, 
petition, motion, brief or other document including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
"A signed legal document violates Rule 11.2 if (1) it is not well grounded in fact; (2) it is not 
warranted by existing law or a good-faith extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and (3) it was interposed for an improper purpose." Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 504 
(2010). 
The Supreme Court has found "that where a party failed to supply an adequate record its 
appeal was not well grounded in fact and thus violated the first element ofI.A.R. 11.1.4" Read v. 
Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 371 (2009); citing Fritts, 144 Idaho at 176. Similarly, it has held where 
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error by the trial court, "its request for this Court 
to act in the absence of evidence to support their claims was unwarranted under the second 
element ofI.A.R. 11.1." Finally, "this Court has held that 'although an attorney's purpose in 
filing an appeal may not always appear clear from the record, this Court can infer intent and 
4 LA.R. 11.1 was subsequently redenominated as LA.R. 11.2. See Lattin, 149 Idaho at 504. 
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purpose from the attorney's actions and the surrounding circumstances." Lattin, 149 Idaho at 
504; citing Fritts, 144 Idaho at 176. 
Throughout this Brief, Respondents have illustrated the deficient manner in which 
Appellant has presented its issues. This lack of reasoned analysis and specific references to the 
record was no more apparent than in Appellant's attempt to take issue with the trial court's 
denial of its motion to continue. Not only did Appellant fail to supply the trial court with a copy 
of its motion, it similarly failed to preserve the record with a copy same for this Court to 
consider. Moreover, the Appellant has yet to make any proffer as to the nature of the evidence it 
was unable to submit in opposition to Respondents' third motion for summary judgment. 
Next, Appellant's challenge of the trial court's denial of its motion to continue and award 
of fees and costs to Respondents were each subject to an abuse of discretion standard. On 
appeal, Appellant did little more than present strained argument accompanied by an invitation for 
this Court to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, Appellant devoted minimal effort to directing 
the court to specific findings in the record and transcript which support his tenuous and 
conclusory claim that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous or that the trial court abused 
its discretion in reaching. When viewed as a whole, there is absolutely no foundation for this 
appeal. 
Further, Appellant's request for an award of fees and costs demonstrates the shallow 
effort it made at researching the pertinent authority and developing the issues on appeal. 
Without devoting any effort at analysis, Appellant merely asserts that it is entitled to an award of 
fees and costs under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. 
For these reasons, along with each of the deficiencies in Appellant's presentation noted 
throughout this Brief, Respondents submit they are entitled to an award oftheir fees under I.C. § 
12-121 and I.A.R. 11.2. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Respondents respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. Further, Respondents requests that it be awarded its costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred defending this Appeal. 
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RESPECFULL Y SUBMITTED this 8th day of October, 2013. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of October, 2013, I caused to be served two (2) 
copies the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of record as 
follows: 
Henry D. Madsen 
Madsen Law Offices, P.C. 
l044 Northwest Blvd, Suite B 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Attorney for Appellant 
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